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A.  Introduction  
 
1.   The Working Group III contribution to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) focuses on 
new literature on the scientific, technological, environmental, economic and social aspects of 
mitigation of climate change, published since the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) and 
the Special Reports on COB2 B Capture and Storage (SRCCS) and on Safeguarding the Ozone 
Layer and the Global Climate System (SROC). 
 
The following summary is organised into six sections after this introduction: 
• Greenhouse gas (GHG) emission trends 
• Mitigation in the short and medium term, across different economic sectors (until 2030)  
• Mitigation in the long-term (beyond 2030) 
• Policies, measures and instruments to mitigate climate change 
• Sustainable development and climate change mitigation 
• Gaps in knowledge. 
 
References to the corresponding chapter sections are indicated at each paragraph in square 
brackets. An explanation of terms, acronyms and chemical symbols used in this SPM can be 
found in the glossary to the main report. 
 
 
B. Greenhouse gas emission trends 
 
2. Global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have grown since pre-industrial times, with an 
increase of 70% between 1970 and 2004 (high agreement, much evidence)TPF1FPT.   
• Since pre-industrial times, increasing emissions of GHGs due to human activities have led 
to a marked increase in atmospheric GHG concentrations [1.3; Working Group I SPM]. 
• Between 1970 and 2004, global emissions of COB2 B, CHB4 B, NB2 BO, HFCs, PFCs and SFB6 B, 
weighted by their global warming potential (GWP), have increased by 70% (24% between 
1990 and 2004), from 28.7 to 49 Gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents (GtCOB2 B-eq) TPF2FPT 
(see Figure SPM.1). The emissions of these gases have increased at different rates. CO B2 B 
emissions have grown between 1970 and 2004 by about 80% (28% between 1990 and 
2004) and represented 77% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2004. 
• The largest growth in global GHG emissions between 1970 and 2004 has come from the 
energy supply sector (an increase of 145%). The growth in direct emissions TPF3FPT  in this period 
from transport was 120%, industry 65% and land use, land use change, and forestry 
(LULUCF) TPF4FPT 40% TPF5FPT. Between 1970 and 1990 direct emissions from agriculture grew by 27% 
                                                 
TP
1
PT Each headline statement has an “agreement/evidence” assessment attached that is supported by the bullets 
underneath. This does not necessarily mean that this level of “agreement/evidence”applies to each bullet. Endbox 1 
provides an explanation of this representation of uncertainty.  
TP
2
PT The definition of carbon dioxide equivalent (COB2B-eq) is the amount of COB2B emission that would cause the same 
radiative forcing as an emitted amount of a well mixed greenhouse gas or a mixture of well mixed greenhouse gases, 
all multiplied with their respective GWPs to take into account the differing times they remain in the atmosphere [WGI 
AR4 Glossary]. 
TP
3
PT Direct emissions in each sector do not include emissions from the electricity sector for the electricity consumed in the 
building, industry and agricultural sectors or of the emissions from refinery operations supplying fuel to the transport 
sector. 
TP
4
PT The term “land use, land use change and forestry” is used here to describe the aggregated emissions of COB2B, CHB4B, 
NB2BO from deforestation, biomass and burning, decay of biomass from logging and deforestation, decay of peat and 
peat fires [1.3.1].  This is broader than emissions from deforestation, which is included as a subset.  The emissions 
reported here do not include carbon uptake (removals). 
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and from buildings by 26%, and the latter remained at approximately at 1990 levels 
thereafter. However, the buildings sector has a high level of electricity use and hence the 
total of direct and indirect emissions in this sector is much higher (75%) than direct 
emissions [1.3, 6.1, 11.3, Figures 1.1 and 1.3].   
• The effect on global emissions of the decrease in global energy intensity (-33%) during 1970 
to 2004 has been smaller than the combined effect of global income growth (77 %) and 
global population growth (69%); both drivers of increasing energy-related COB2 B emissions 
(Figure SPM.2). The long-term trend of a declining carbon intensity of energy supply 
reversed after 2000. Differences in terms of per capita income, per capita emissions, and 
energy intensity among countries remain significant. (Figure SPM.3). In 2004 UNFCCC 
Annex I countries held a 20% share in world population, produced 57% of world Gross 
Domestic Product based on Purchasing Power Parity (GDP BpppB) TPF6FPTB,B and accounted for 46% of 
global GHG emissions (Figure SPM.3a) [1.3]. 
• The emissions of ozone depleting substances (ODS) controlled under the Montreal 
ProtocolTPF7FPT, which are also GHGs, have declined significantly since the 1990s. By 2004 the 
emissions of these gases were about 20% of their 1990 level [1.3]. 
• A range of policies, including those on climate change, energy securityTPF8FPT, and sustainable 
development, have been effective in reducing GHG emissions in different sectors and many 
countries. The scale of such measures, however, has not yet been large enough to 
counteract the global growth in emissions [1.3, 12.2]. 
 
3. With current climate change mitigation policies and related sustainable development 
practices, global GHG emissions will continue to grow over the next few decades T(highT 
agreement, much evidence). 
• The SRES (non-mitigation) scenarios project an increase of baseline global GHG emissions 
by a range of 9.7 GtCOB2 B-eq to 36.7 GtCOB2 B-eq (25-90%) between 2000 and 2030TPF9FPT (Box 
SPM.1 and Figure SPM.4). In these scenarios, fossil fuels are projected to maintain their 
dominant position in the global energy mix to 2030 and beyond. Hence COB2 B emissions 
between 2000 and 2030 from energy use are projected to grow 45 to 110% over that period. 
Two thirds to three quarters of this increase in energy COB2 B emissions is projected to come 
from non-Annex I regions, with their average per capita energy COB2 B emissions being 
projected to remain substantially lower (2.8-5.1 tCOB2 B/cap) than those in Annex I regions 
(9.6-15.1 tCOB2 B/cap) by 2030. According to SRES scenarios, their economies are projected 
to have a lower energy use per unit of GDP (6.2 – 9.9 MJ/US$ GDP) than that of non-
Annex I countries (11.0 – 21.6 MJ/US$ GDP). [1.3, 3.2] 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
TP
5
PT This trend is for the total LULUCF emissions, of which emissions from deforestation are a subset and, owing to large 
data uncertainties, is significantly less certain than for other sectors. The rate of deforestation globally was slightly 
lower in the 2000-2005 period than in the 1990-2000 period [9.2.1]. 
TP
6
PT The GDPBpppB metric is used for illustrative purposes only for this report. For an explanation of PPP and Market 
Exchange Rate (MER) GDP calculations, see footnote 12. 
TP
7
PT Halons, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), methyl chloroform (CHB3BCCl B3B), carbon 
tetrachloride (CClB4B) and methyl bromide (CHB3B r). 
TP
8
PT Energy security refers to security of energy supply. 
PT
9
T
 
PThe SRES 2000 GHG emissions assumed here are 39.8 GtCOB2B-eq, i.e. lower than the emissions reported in the 
EDGAR database for 2000 (45 GtCOB2B-eq). This is mostly due to differences in LULUCF emissions. 
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[2000 and 2004 bars will be placed closer to reflect the smaller period between the years] 
[Representation of note references will be improved] 
 
Figure SPM 1:  Global Warming Potential (GWP) weighted global greenhouse gas emissions 
1970-2004. 100 year GWPs from IPCC 1996 (SAR) were used to convert emissions to CO B2 B-eq. (cf. 
UNFCCC reporting guidelines). COB2 B, CHB4 B, NB2 BO, HFCs, PFCs and SFB6  Bfrom all sources are 
included. 
1)
2)
4) 5)
3)
GtCO B2B-eq/yr 
6)
7)
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The two COB2 B emission categories reflect COB2 B emissions from energy production and use (second 
from bottom) and from land use changes (third from the bottom) [Figure 1.1a].  
 
Notes: 
1. Other NB2 BO includes industrial processes, deforestation/savannah burning, waste water and 
waste incineration. 
2. Other is CH B4 B from industrial processes and savannah burning. 
3. COB2 B emissions from decay (decomposition) of above ground biomass that remains after logging 
and deforestation and COB2 B from peat fires and decay of drained peat soils.  
4. As well as traditional biomass use at 10% of total, assuming 90% is from sustainable biomass 
production. Corrected for 10% carbon of biomass that is assumed to remain as charcoal after 
combustion. 
5. For large-scale forest and scrubland biomass burning averaged data for 1997-2002 based on 
Global Fire Emissions Data base satellite data. 
6. Cement production and natural gas flaring. 
7. Fossil fuel use includes emissions from feedstocks.  
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Figure SPM 2: Relative global development of Gross Domestic Product measured in PPP 
(GDPBppp B), Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES), COB2 B emissions (from fossil fuel burning, gas 
flaring and cement manufacturing) and Population (Pop). In addition, in dotted lines, the figure 
shows Income per capita (GDPBppp B/Pop), Energy Intensity (TPES/GDP Bppp B), Carbon Intensity of 
energy supply (COB2 B/TPES), and Emission Intensity of the economic production process 
(COB2 B/GDP Bppp B) for the period 1970-2004. [Figure 1.5] 
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Figure SPM 3a:  Year 2004 distribution of regional per capita GHG 
emissions (all Kyoto gases, including those from land-use) over the 
population of different country groupings. The percentages in the bars 
indicate a regions share in global GHG emissions [Figure 1.4a].   
Figure SPM 3b: Year 2004 distribution of regional GHG emissions 
(all Kyoto gases, including those from land-use) per US$ of GDPBppp B 
over the GDP BpppB of different country groupings. The percentages in 
the bars indicate a regions share in global GHG emissions [Figure 
1.4b]. 
 
 [Authors will clarify country groupings in TS and chapter 1 figures; improve the editorial representation (enlarge) of the figure, including 
allowing for b/w printing] 
[Include title above figures] 
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Figure SPM 4:  Global GHG emissions for 2000 and projected baseline emissionsX10X for 2030 and 
2100 from IPCC SRES and the post-SRES literature. The figure provides the emissions from the six 
illustrative SRES scenarios. It also provides the frequency distribution of the emissions in the post-
SRES scenarios (5 PthP, 25Pth P, median, 75 Pth P, 95Pth P percentile), as covered in chapter 3. F-gases cover 
HFCs, PFCs and SFB6 B [1.3, 3.2, Figure 1.7]. 
 
4. Baseline emissions scenarios published since SRESTPF10FPT, are comparable in range to those 
presented in the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (25- 135 GtCO B2 B-eq/yr 
in 2100, see Figure SPM.4). (high agreement, much evidence) 
• Studies since SRES used lower values for some drivers for emissions, notably population 
projections. However, for those studies incorporating these new population projections, 
changes in other drivers, such as economic growth, resulted in little change in overall 
emission levels. Economic growth projections for Africa, Latin America and the Middle East 
to 2030 in post-SRES baseline scenarios are lower than in SRES, but this has only minor 
effects on global economic growth and overall emissions [3.2]. 
• Representation of aerosol and aerosol precursor emissions, including sulphur dioxide, black 
carbon, and organic carbon, which have a net cooling effectTPF11FPT has improved. Generally, they 
are projected to be lower than reported in SRES [3.2]. 
• Available studies indicate that the choice of exchange rate for GDP (MER or PPP) does not 
appreciably affect the projected emissions, when used consistentlyTPF12FPT. The differences, if any, 
                                                 
TP
10
PT Baseline scenarios do not include additional climate policy above current ones; more recent studies differ with respect 
to UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol inclusion. 
TP
11
PT see AR4 WG I report, chapter 10.2. 
TP
12
PT Since TAR, there has been a debate on the use of different exchange rates in emission scenarios. Two metrics are 
used to compare GDP between countries. Use of MER is preferable for analyses involving internationally traded 
products. Use of PPP, is preferable for analyses involving comparisons of income between countries at very different 
stages of development. Most of the monetary units in this report are expressed in MER. This reflects the large majority 
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are small compared to the uncertainties caused by assumptions on other parameters in the 
scenarios, e.g. technological change [3.2]. 
 
 
Box SPM.1: The emission scenarios of the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) 
 
A1. The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid economic growth, 
global population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of 
new and more efficient technologies. Major underlying themes are convergence among regions, 
capacity building and increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in 
regional differences in per capita income. The A1 scenario family develops into three groups that 
describe alternative directions of technological change in the energy system. The three A1 groups 
are distinguished by their technological emphasis: fossil intensive (A1FI), non fossil energy sources 
(A1T), or a balance across all sources (A1B) (where balanced is defined as not relying too  heavily 
on one particular energy source, on the assumption that similar improvement rates apply to all 
energy  supply and end use technologies).  
 
A2. The A2 storyline and scenario family describes a very heterogeneous world. The underlying 
theme is self reliance and preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns across regions converge 
very slowly, which results in continuously increasing population. Economic development is 
primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic growth and technological change more 
fragmented and slower than other storylines.  
 
B1. The B1 storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with the same global 
population, that  peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, as in the A1 storyline, but with rapid 
change in economic structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in 
material intensity and the introduction of clean and resource efficient technologies. The emphasis is 
on global solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability, including improved 
equity, but without additional climate initiatives.  
 
B2. The B2 storyline and scenario family describes a world in which the emphasis is on local 
solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability. It is a world with continuously 
increasing global population, at a rate lower than A2, intermediate levels of economic development, 
and less rapid and more diverse technological change than in the B1 and A1 storylines. While the 
scenario is also oriented towards environmental protection and social equity, it focuses on local and 
regional levels.  
 
An illustrative scenario was chosen for each of the six scenario groups A1B, A1FI, A1T, A2, B1 
and B2.  All should be considered equally sound.  
 
The SRES scenarios do not include additional climate initiatives, which means that no scenarios are 
included that explicitly assume implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change or the emissions targets of the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
This box summarizing the SRES scenarios is taken from the Third Assessment Report and has been 
subject to prior line by line approval by the Panel. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of emissions mitigation literature that is calibrated in MER. When monetary units are expressed in PPP, this is denoted 
by GDPBppp B. B B 
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C. Mitigation in the short and medium term (until 2030) 
 
 
Box SPM 2:  Mitigation potential and analytical approaches  
 
The concept of “mitigation potential” has been developed to assess the scale of GHG reductions 
that could be made, relative to emission baselines, for a given level of carbon price (expressed in 
cost per unit of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions avoided or reduced). Mitigation potential is 
further differentiated in terms of “market potential” and “economic potential”. 
 
Market potential is the mitigation potential based on private costs and private discount ratesTPF13FPT, 
which might be expected to occur under forecast market conditions, including policies and 
measures currently in place, noting that barriers limit actual uptake [2.4]. 
 
Economic potential is the mitigation potential, which takes into account social costs and benefits 
and social discount ratesTPF14FPT, assuming that market efficiency is improved by policies and measures 
and barriers are removed [2.4]. 
 
Studies of market potential can be used to inform policy makers about mitigation potential with 
existing policies and barriers, while studies of economic potentials show what might be achieved 
if appropriate new and additional policies were put into place to remove barriers and include 
social costs and benefits. The economic potential is therefore generally greater than the market 
potential.  
 
Mitigation potential is estimated using different types of approaches. There are two broad classes 
– “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches, which primarily have been used to assess the 
economic potential.  
 
Bottom-up studies are based on assessment of mitigation options, emphasizing specific 
technologies and regulations. They are typically sectoral studies taking the macro-economy as 
unchanged. Sector estimates have been aggregated, as in the TAR, to provide an estimate of 
global mitigation potential for this assessment.   
 
Top-down studies assess the economy-wide potential of mitigation options. They use globally 
consistent frameworks and aggregated information about mitigation options and capture macro-
economic and market feedbacks.  
 
Bottom-up and top-down models have become more similar since the TAR as top-down models 
have incorporated more technological mitigation options and bottom-up models have 
incorporated more macroeconomic and market feedbacks as well as adopting barrier analysis 
into their model structures.  
 
Bottom-up studies in particular are useful for the assessment of specific policy options at sectoral 
level, e.g. options for improving energy efficiency, while top-down studies are useful for 
                                                 
TP
13
PT Private costs and discount rates reflect the perspective of private consumers and companies; see Glossary for a fuller 
description. 
TP
14
PT Social costs and discount rates reflect the perspective of society. Social discount rates are lower than those used by 
private investors; see Glossary for a fuller description. 
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assessing cross-sectoral and economy-wide climate change policies, such as carbon taxes and 
stabilization policies. 
 
However, current bottom-up and top-down studies of economic potential have limitations in 
considering life-style choices, and in including all externalities such as local air pollution. They 
have limited representation of some regions, countries, sectors, gases, and barriers. The projected 
mitigation costs do not take into account potential benefits of avoided climate change. 
 
 
 
Box SPM 3: Assumptions in studies on mitigation portfolios and macro-economic costs 
 
Studies on mitigation portfolios and macro-economic costs assessed in this report are based on 
top-down modelling. Most models use a global least cost approach to mitigation portfolios and 
with universal emissions trading, assuming transparent markets, no transaction cost, and thus 
perfect implementation of mitigation measures throughout the 21Pst P century. Costs are given for a 
specific point in time.  
 
Global modelled costs will increase if some regions, sectors (e.g. land-use), options or gases are 
excluded. Global modelled costs will decrease with lower baselines, use of revenues from carbon 
taxes and auctioned permits, and if induced technological learning is included. These models do 
not consider climate benefits and generally also co-benefits of mitigation measures, or equity 
issues. 
 
 
 
5. Both bottom-up and top-down studies indicate that there is substantial economic potential 
for the mitigation of global GHG emissions over the coming decades, that could offset the 
projected growth of global emissions or reduce emissions below current levels (high 
agreement, much evidence). 
 
Uncertainties in the estimates are shown as ranges in the tables below to reflect the ranges of 
baselines, rates of technological change and other factors that are specific to the different 
approaches. Furthermore, uncertainties also arise from the limited information for global 
coverage of countries, sectors and gases.  
 
Bottom-up studies: 
• In 2030, the economic potential estimated for this assessment from bottom-up approaches 
(see Box SPM.2) is presented in Table SPM 1 below and Figure SPM 5A. For reference: 
emissions in 2000 were equal to 43 GtCOB2 B-eq. [11.3]: 
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Table SPM 1: Global economic mitigation potential in 2030 estimated from bottom-up studies. 
Carbon price  
 
 
 
(US$/tCOB2 B-eq) 
Economic potential
 
 
 
(GtCOB2 B-eq/yr) 
Reduction relative to 
SRES A1 B 
(68  GtCOB2 B- eq/yr) 
 
(%) 
Reduction  
relative to  
SRES B2 
(49 GtCOB2 B- eq/yr) 
(%) 
0 5-7 7-10 10-14 
20  9-17 14-25 19-35 
50  13-26 20-38 27-52 
100  16-31 23-46 32-63 
 
• Studies suggest that mitigation opportunities with net negative costsTPF15FPT  have the potential to 
reduce emissions by around 6 GtCOB2 B-eq/yr in 2030. Realizing these requires dealing with 
implementation barriers [11.3]. 
• No one sector or technology can address the entire mitigation challenge. All assessed sectors 
contribute to the total (see Figure SPM 6). The technologies with the largest economic 
potential for the respective sectors are shown in Table SPM.3 [4.3, 4.4, 5.4, 6.5, 7.5, 8.4, 
9.4, 10.4]. 
  
Top-down studies: 
• Top-down studies calculate an emission reduction for 2030 as presented in Table SPM 2 
below and Figure SPM 5B. The global economic potentials found in the top-down studies 
are in line with bottom-up studies (see Box SPM 2), though there are considerable 
differences at the sectoral level [3.6]. 
 
Table SPM.2: Global economic mitigation potential in 2030 estimated from top-down studies. 
Carbon price  
 
 
 
(US$/tCOB2 B-eq) 
Economic 
potential  
 
 
(GtCOB2 B-eq/yr) 
Reduction relative to 
SRES A1 B 
(68 GtCOB2 B eq/yr) 
 
(%) 
Reduction  
relative to 
SRES B2 
(49 GtCOB2 B eq/yr) 
(%) 
20  9-18 13-27 18-37 
50  14-23 21-34 29-47 
100  17-26 25-38 35-53 
 
• The estimates in Table SPM 2 were derived from stabilization scenarios, i.e., runs towards 
long-run stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentration [3.6]. 
                                                 
TP
15
PT In this report, as in the SAR and the TAR, options with net negative costs (no regrets opportunities) are defined 
as those options whose benefits such as reduced energy costs and reduced emissions of local/regional pollutants 
equal or exceed their costs to society, excluding the benefits of avoided climate change (see Box SPM 1). 
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Figure SPM 5A:  
Global economic potential in  
2030 estimated from bottom-up studies  
(data from Table SPM 1) 
Figure SPM 5B:  
Global economic potential in  
2030 estimated from top-down studies  
(data from Table SPM 2) 
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Table SPM 3:  Key mitigation technologies and practices by sector. Sectors and technologies are listed in no particular order. Non-technological 
practices, such as lifestyle changes, which are cross-cutting, are not included in this table (but are addressed in paragraph 7 in this SPM).  
Sector Key mitigation technologies and practices currently commercially 
available.  
Key mitigation technologies and practices projected to be 
commercialized before 2030.  
Energy Supply 
[4.3, 4.4] 
Improved supply and distribution efficiency;  fuel switching from coal 
to gas;  nuclear power; renewable heat and power (hydropower, solar, 
wind, geothermal  and bioenergy); combined heat and power; early 
applications of CCS (e.g. storage of removed COB2B from natural gas) 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) for gas, biomass and coal-fired 
electricity generating facilities; advanced nuclear power; advanced 
renewable energy, including tidal and waves energy, concentrating 
solar, and solar PV. 
Transport 
[5.4] 
More fuel efficient vehicles;  hybrid vehicles; cleaner diesel vehicles;  
biofuels; modal shifts from road transport to rail and  public transport 
systems; non-motorised transport (cycling, walking); land-use and 
transport planning 
Second generation biofuels; higher  efficiency aircraft; advanced 
electric and hybrid vehicles with more powerful and reliable 
batteries 
Buildings 
[6.5] 
Efficient lighting and daylighting; more efficient electrical appliances 
and heating and cooling devices; improved cook stoves, improved 
insulation ; passive and active solar design for heating and  cooling;  
alternative refrigeration fluids, recovery and recycle of fluorinated 
gases  
Integrated design of commercial buildings including technologies, 
such as intelligent meters that provide feedback and control; solar 
PV integrated in buildings  
Industry 
[7.5] 
More efficient end-use electrical equipment; heat and power recovery; 
material recycling and substitution; control of non-COB2 B gas emissions; 
and a wide array of process-specific technologies 
Advanced energy efficiency; CCS for cement, ammonia,  and  iron 
manufacture; inert electrodes for aluminium manufacture  
Agriculture 
[8.4] 
Improved crop and grazing land management to increase soil carbon 
storage; restoration of cultivated peaty soils and degraded lands;  
improved rice cultivation techniques and livestock and manure 
management to reduce CHB4B emissions; improved nitrogen fertilizer 
application techniques to reduce NB2 BO emissions; dedicated energy 
crops to replace fossil fuel use; improved energy efficiency 
Improvements of crops yields  
Forestry/forests 
[9.4] 
Afforestation; reforestation; forest management; reduced deforestation; 
harvested wood product management; use of forestry products for 
bioenergy to replace fossil fuel use 
Tree species improvement to increase biomass productivity and 
carbon sequestration. Improved remote sensing technologies for 
analysis of vegetation/ soil carbon sequestration potential and 
mapping land use change  
Waste [10.4] Landfill methane recovery; waste incineration with energy recovery; 
composting of organic waste; controlled waste water treatment; 
recycling and waste minimization 
Biocovers and biofilters to optimize CHB4B oxidation 
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(potential at 
<US$100/tC
O B2B-eq: 2.4 - 
4.7 Gt COB2B-
eq/yr) 
(potential at 
<US$100/tC
O B2B-eq: 1.6 - 
2.5 Gt COB2B-
eq/yr) 
(potential 
at 
<US$100
/tCO B2B-eq: 
5.3 -6.7 
(potential at 
<US$100/tC
O B2B-eq: 2.5 - 
5.5 Gt COB2B-
eq/yr) 
(potential at 
<US$100/tC
O B2B-eq: 2.3  -
6.4 Gt COB2B-
eq/yr) 
(potential at 
<US$100/tC
O B2B-eq: 1.3 - 
4.2 Gt COB2B-
eq/yr) 
(potential at 
<US$100/tC
O B2B-eq: 0.4 - 
1 Gt COB2B-
eq/yr) 
Figure SPM 6: Estimated sectoral economic potential for global mitigation for different 
regions as a function of carbon price in 2030 from bottom-up studies, compared to the 
respective baselines assumed in the sector assessments. A full explanation of the derivation 
of this figure is found in 11.3. 5 
 
Notes: 
1. The ranges for global economic potentials as assessed in each sector are shown by 
vertical lines. The ranges are based on end-use allocations of emissions, meaning that 
emissions of electricity use are counted towards the end-use sectors and not to the 10 
energy supply sector. 
2. The estimated potentials have been constrained by the availability of studies particularly 
at high carbon price levels. 
3. . Sectors used different baselines. For industry the SRES B2 baseline was taken, for 
energy supply and transport the WEO 2004 baseline was used; the building sector is 15 
based on a baseline in between SRES B2 and A1B; for waste, SRES A1B driving forces 
were used to construct a waste specific baseline, agriculture and forestry used baselines 
that mostly used B2 driving forces. 
4. Only global totals for transport are shown because international aviation is included 
[5.4]. 20 
5. Categories excluded are: non-COB2 Bemissions in buildings and transport, part of material 
efficiency options, heat production and cogeneration in energy supply, heavy duty 
vehicles, shipping and high-occupancy passenger transport, most high-cost options for 
buildings, wastewater treatment, emission reduction from coal mines and gas pipelines, 
fluorinated gases from energy supply and transport. The underestimation of the total 25 
economic potential from these emissions is of the order of 10-15%. 
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6. In 2030 macro-economic costs for multi-gas mitigation, consistent with emissions 
trajectories towards stabilization between 445 and 710 ppm CO B2B-eq, are estimated 
at between a 3% decrease of global GDP and a small increase, compared to the 
baseline (see Table SPM.4). However, regional costs may differ significantly from 
global averages (high agreement, medium evidence) (see Box SPM.3 for the 5 
methodologies and assumptions of these results). 
• The majority of studies conclude that reduction of GDP relative to the GDP baseline 
increases with the stringency of the stabilization target. 
 
Table SPM.4: Estimated global macro-economic costs in 2030TPF16FPT for least-cost trajectories 10 
towards different long-term stabilization levels.TPF17FPTP, TF18FPPTP   
Stabilization levels  
 
 
(ppm COB2 B-eq) 
Median 
GDP reductionTPF19FPT 
 
(%) 
Range of GDP reduction  
PX
19
X
,
P TPF20FPT 
 
 
(%) 
Reduction of average 
annual GDP growth 
ratesPX19X,P TPF21FPT   
(percentage points) 
590-710 0.2 -0.6 – 1.2 < 0.06 
535-590 0.6 0.2 – 2.5 <0.1 
445-535 TPF22FPT  not available < 3 < 0.12 
 
• Depending on the existing tax system and spending of the revenues, modelling 
studies indicate that costs may be substantially lower under the assumption that 
revenues from carbon taxes or auctioned permits under an emission trading system 15 
are used to promote low-carbon technologies or reform of existing taxes [11.4]. 
• Studies that assume the possibility that climate change policy induces enhanced 
technological change also give lower costs. However, this may require higher 
upfront investment in order to achieve costs reductions thereafter [3.3, 3.4, 11.4, 
11.5, 11.6]. 20 
• Although most models show GDP losses, some show GDP gains because they 
assume that baselines are non-optimal and mitigation policies improve market 
efficiencies, or they assume that more technological change may be induced by 
mitigation policies. Examples of market inefficiencies include unemployed 
resources, distortionary taxes and/or subsidies [3.3, 11.4]. 25 
• A multi-gas approach and inclusion of carbon sinks generally reduces costs 
substantially compared to COB2 B emission abatement only. 
                                                 
TP
16
PT For a given stabilization level, GDP reduction would increase over time in most models after 2030. Long-
term costs also become more uncertain. [Figure 3.25]  
TP
17
PT Results based on studies using various baselines. 
TP
18
PT Studies vary in terms of the point in time stabilization is achieved; generally this is in 2100 or later. 
TP
19
PT This is global GDP based market exchange rates. 
TP
20
PT The median and the 10PthP and 90PthP percentile range of the analyzed data are given. 
TP
21
PT The calculation of the reduction of the annual growth rate is based on the average reduction during the 
period till 2030 that would result in the indicated GDP decrease in 2030. 
TP
22
PT The number of studies that report GDP results is relatively small and they generally use low baselines. 
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• Regional costs are largely dependent on the assumed stabilization level and baseline 
scenario. The allocation regime is also important, but for most countries to a lesser 
extent than the stabilization level [11.4, 13.3]. 
 
7. Changes in lifestyle and behaviour patterns can contribute to climate change 5 
mitigation across all sectors. Management practices can also have a positive role. 
(high agreement, medium evidence) 
 
• Lifestyle changes can reduce GHG emissions. Changes in lifestyles and 
consumption patterns that emphasize resource conservation can contribute to 10 
developing a low-carbon economy that is both equitable and sustainable [4.1, 6.7]. 
• Education and training programmes can help overcome barriers to the market 
acceptance of energy efficiency, particularly in combination with other measures 
[Table 6.6].  
• Changes in occupant behaviour, cultural patterns and consumer choice and use of 15 
technologies can result in considerable reduction in COB2 B emissions related to energy 
use in buildings [6.7].  
• Transport Demand Management, which includes urban planning (that can reduce the 
demand for travel) and provision of information and educational techniques (that 
can reduce car usage and lead to an efficient driving style) can support GHG 20 
mitigation [5.1]. 
• In industry, management tools that include staff training, reward systems, regular 
feedback, documentation of existing practices can help overcome industrial 
organization barriers, reduce energy use, and GHG emissions [7.3]. 
 25 
8. While studies use different methodologies, in all analyzed world regions near-term 
health co-benefits from reduced air pollution as a result of actions to reduce GHG 
emissions can be substantial and may offset a substantial fraction of mitigation 
costs (high agreement, much evidence). 
• Including co-benefits other than health, such as increased energy security, and 30 
increased agricultural production and reduced pressure on natural ecosystems, due to 
decreased tropospheric ozone concentrations, would further enhance cost savings 
[11.8]. 
• Integrating air pollution abatement and climate change mitigation policies offers 
potentially large cost reductions compared to treating those policies in isolation 35 
[11.8]. 
 
9. Literature since TAR confirms that there may be effects from Annex I countries 
action on the global economy and global emissions, although the scale of carbon 
leakage remains uncertain (high agreement, medium evidence). 40 
 
• Fossil fuel exporting nations (in both Annex I and non-Annex I countries) may 
expect, as indicated in TARTPF23FPT, lower demand and prices and lower GDP growth due 
                                                 
TP
23
PT See TAR WG III (2001) SPM paragraph 16.  
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to mitigation policies. The extent of this spill over TPF24FPT depends strongly on 
assumptions related to policy decisions and oil market conditions [11.7]. 
• Critical uncertainties remain in the assessment of carbon leakageTPF25FPT. Most 
equilibrium modelling support the conclusion in the TAR of economy-wide leakage 
from Kyoto action in the order of 5-20%, which would be less if competitive low-5 
emissions technologies were effectively diffused [11.7] . 
 
10. New energy infrastructure investments in developing countries, upgrades of energy 
infrastructure in industrialized countries, and policies that promote energy 
security, can, in many cases, create opportunities to achieve GHG emission 10 
reductionsX28X compared to baseline scenarios. Additional co-benefits are country-
specific but often include air pollution abatement, balance of trade improvement, 
provision of modern energy services to rural areas and employment (high 
agreement, much evidence). 
• Future energy infrastructure investment decisions, expected to total over 20 trillion 15 
US$ TPF26FPT between now and 2030, will have long term impacts on GHG emissions, 
because of the long life-times of energy plants and other infrastructure capital stock. 
The widespread diffusion of low-carbon technologies may take many decades, even 
if early investments in these technologies are made attractive. Initial estimates show 
that returning global energy-related COB2 B emissions to 2005 levels by 2030 would 20 
require a large shift in the pattern of investment, although the net additional 
investment required ranges from negligible to 5-10% [4.1, 4.4, 11.6]. 
• It is often more cost-effective to invest in end-use energy efficiency improvement than 
in increasing energy supply to satisfy demand for energy services. Efficiency 
improvement has a positive effect on energy security, local and regional air pollution 25 
abatement, and employment [4.2, 4.3, 6.5, 7.7, 11.3, 11.8]. 
• Renewable energy generally has a positive effect on energy security, employment 
and on air quality. Given costs relative to other supply options, renewable electricity, 
which accounted for 18% of the electricity supply in 2005, can have a 30-35% share 
of the total electricity supply in 2030 at carbon prices up to 50 US$/tCOB2 B-eq [4.3, 30 
4.4, 11.3, 11.6, 11.8]. 
• The higher the market prices of fossil fuels, the more low-carbon alternatives will be 
competitive, although price volatility will be a disincentive for investors. Higher 
priced conventional oil resources, on the other hand, may be replaced by high carbon 
alternatives such as from oil sands, oil shales, heavy oils, and synthetic fuels from 35 
coal and gas, leading to increasing GHG emissions, unless production plants are 
equipped with CCS [4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5]. 
• Given costs relative to other supply options, nuclear power, which accounted for 
16% of the electricity supply in 2005, can have an 18% share of the total electricity 
                                                 
TP
24
PT Spill over effects of mitigation in a cross-sectoral perspective are the effects of mitigation policies and 
measures in one country or group of countries on sectors in other countries. 
TP
25
PT Carbon leakage is defined as the increase in COB2 B emissions outside the countries taking domestic mitigation 
action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries. 
TP
26
PT 20 trillion = 20000 billion= 20*10P12P. 
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supply in 2030 at carbon prices up to 50 US$/tCOB2 B-eq, but safety, weapons 
proliferation and waste remain as constraints [4.2, 4.3, 4.4]TPF27FPT.  
• CCS in underground geological formations is a new technology with the potential to 
make an important contribution to mitigation by 2030. Technical, economic and 
regulatory developments will affect the actual contribution [4.3, 4.4, 7.3]. 5 
 
11. There are multiple mitigation options in the transport sectorTPF28FPT, but their effect may 
be counteracted by growth in the sector. Mitigation options are faced with many 
barriers, such as consumer preferences and lack of policy frameworks (medium 
agreement, medium evidence).  10 
• Improved vehicle efficiency measures, leading to fuel savings, in many  cases have 
net benefits (at least for light-duty vehicles), but the market potential is much lower 
than the economic potential due to the influence of other consumer considerations, 
such as performance and size. There is not enough information to assess the 
mitigation potential for heavy-duty vehicles. Market forces alone, including rising 15 
fuel costs, are therefore not expected to lead to significant emission reductions [5.3, 
5.4]. 
• Biofuels might play an important role in addressing GHG emissions in the transport 
sector, depending on their production pathway. Biofuels used as gasoline and diesel 
fuel additives/substitutes are projected to grow to 3% of total transport energy 20 
demand in the baseline in 2030. This could increase to about 5-10%, depending on 
future oil and carbon prices, improvements in vehicle efficiency and the success of 
technologies to utilise cellulose biomass [5.3, 5.4]. 
• Modal shifts from road to rail and inland waterway shipping and from low-
occupancy to high-occupancy passenger transportationTPF29FPT, as well as land-use, urban 25 
planning and non-motorized transport offer opportunities for GHG mitigation, 
depending on local conditions and policies [5.3, 5.5]. 
• Medium term mitigation potential for COB2 B emissions from the aviation sector can 
come from improved fuel efficiency, which can be achieved through a variety of 
means, including technology, operations and air traffic management. However, such 30 
improvements are expected to only partially offset the growth of aviation emissions. 
Total mitigation potential in the sector would also need to account for non-COB2 B 
climate impacts of aviation emissions [5.3, 5.4]. 
• Realizing emissions reductions in the transport sector is often a co-benefit of 
addressing traffic congestion, air quality and energy security [5.5]. 35 
 
12. Energy efficiency options X28X for new and existing buildings could considerably reduce 
CO B2 B emissions with net economic benefit. Many barriers exist against tapping this 
potential, but there are also large co-benefits (high agreement, much evidence).  
• By 2030, about 30% of the projected GHG emissions in the building sector can be 40 
avoided with net economic benefit [6.4, 6.5]. 
                                                 
TP
27
PT Austria could not agree with this statement. 
TP
28
PT See Table SPM.1 and Figure SPM.6. 
TP
29
PT Including rail, road and marine mass transit and carpooling 
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• Energy efficient buildings, while limiting the growth of COB2 B emissions, can also 
improve indoor and outdoor air quality, improve social welfare and enhance energy 
security [6.6, 6.7]. 
• Opportunities for realising GHG reductions in the building sector exist worldwide. 
However, multiple barriers make it difficult to realise this potential. These barriers 5 
include availability of technology, financing, poverty, higher costs of reliable 
information, limitations inherent in building designs and an appropriate portfolio of 
policies and programs [6.7, 6.8]. 
• The magnitude of the above barriers is higher in the developing countries and this 
makes it more difficult for them to achieve the GHG reduction potential of the 10 
building sector [6.7]. 
 
13. The economic potential in the industrial sectorX28X is predominantly located in energy 
intensive industries. Full use of available mitigation options is not being made in 
either industrialized or developing nations (high agreement, much evidence).  15 
• Many industrial facilities in developing countries are new and include the latest 
technology with the lowest specific emissions. However, many older, inefficient 
facilities remain in both industrialized and developing countries. Upgrading these 
facilities can deliver significant emission reductions [7.1, 7.3, 7.4]. 
• The slow rate of capital stock turnover, lack of financial and technical resources, and 20 
limitations in the ability of firms, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, 
to access and absorb technological information are key barriers to full use of 
available mitigation options [7.6]. 
 
14. Agricultural practices collectively can make a significant contribution at low cost X28X 25 
to increasing soil carbon sinks, to GHG emission reductions, and by contributing 
biomass feedstocks for energy use (medium agreement, medium evidence). 
• A large proportion of the mitigation potential of agriculture (excluding bioenergy) 
arises from soil carbon sequestration, which has strong synergies with sustainable 
agriculture and generally reduces vulnerability to climate change [8.4, 8.5, 8.8]. 30 
• Stored soil carbon may be vulnerable to loss through both land management change 
and climate change [8.10]. 
• Considerable mitigation potential is also available from reductions in methane and 
nitrous oxide emissions in some agricultural systems [8.4, 8.5]. 
• There is no universally applicable list of mitigation practices; practices need to be 35 
evaluated for individual agricultural systems and settings [8.4]. 
• Biomass from agricultural residues and dedicated energy crops can be an important 
bioenergy feedstock, but its contribution to mitigation depends on demand for 
bioenergy from transport and energy supply, on water availability, and on 
requirements of land for food and fibre production. Widespread use of agricultural 40 
land for biomass production for energy may compete with other land uses and can 
have positive and negative environmental impacts and implications for food security 
[8.4, 8.8]. 
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15. Forest-related mitigation activities can considerably reduce emissions from sources 
and increase CO B2B removals by sinks at low costsX28X, and can be designed to create 
synergies with adaptation and sustainable development (high agreement, much 
evidence)TPF30FPT. 
• About 65% of the total mitigation potential (up to 100 US$/tCOB2 B-eq) is located in 5 
the tropics and about 50% of the total could be achieved by reducing emissions from 
deforestation [9.4]. 
• Climate change can affect the mitigation potential of the forest sector (i.e., native 
and planted forests) and is expected to be different for different regions and sub-
regions, both in magnitude and direction [9.5]. 10 
• Forest-related mitigation options can be designed and implemented to be compatible 
with adaptation, and can have substantial co-benefits in terms of employment, 
income generation, biodiversity and watershed conservation, renewable energy 
supply and poverty alleviation [9.5, 9.6, 9.7]. 
 15 
16. Post-consumer waste TPF31FPT is a small contributor to global GHG emissionsTPF32FPT (<5%), but 
the waste sector can positively contribute to GHG mitigation at low costX28X and 
promote sustainable development (high agreement, much evidence). 
• Existing waste management practices can provide effective mitigation of GHG 
emissions from this sector: a wide range of mature, environmentally effective 20 
technologies are commercially available to mitigate emissions and provide co-
benefits for improved public health and safety, soil protection and pollution 
prevention, and local energy supply [10.3, 10.4, 10.5]. 
• Waste minimization and recycling provide important indirect mitigation benefits 
through the conservation of energy and materials [10.4]. 25 
• Lack of local capital is a key constraint for waste and wastewater management in 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition. Lack of expertise 
on sustainable technology is also an important barrier [10.6]. 
 
17. Geo-engineering options, such as ocean fertilization to remove COB2 B directly from 30 
the atmosphere, or blocking sunlight by bringing material into the upper 
atmosphere, remain largely speculative and unproven, and with the risk of 
unknown side-effects. Reliable cost estimates for these options have not been 
published (medium agreement, limited evidence) [11.2]. 
                                                 
TP
30
PT Tuvalu noted difficulties with the reference to “low costs” as Chapter 9, page 15 of the WG III report states 
that: “the cost of forest mitigation projects rise significantly when opportunity costs of land are taken into 
account”.  
TP
31
PT Industrial waste is covered in the industry sector. 
TP
32
PT GHGs from waste include landfill and wastewater methane, wastewater NB2BO, and COB2B from incineration of 
fossil carbon. 
Summary for Policymakers IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Working Group III 
 
   
 22 of 36  
7-5-2007 1:46 am  
  
D. Mitigation in the long term (after 2030) 
 
18. In order to stabilize the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere, emissions would 
need to peak and decline thereafter.  The lower the stabilization level, the more 
quickly this peak and decline would need to occur. Mitigation efforts over the next 5 
two to three decades will have a large impact on opportunities to achieve lower 
stabilization levels (see Table SPM.5, and Figure SPM. 8)TPF33FPT (high agreement, much 
evidence). 
 
• Recent studies using multi-gas reduction have explored lower stabilization levels than 10 
reported in TAR. 
• Assessed studies contain a range of emissions profiles for achieving stabilization of 
GHG concentrationsTPF34FPT. Most of these studies used a least cost approach and include 
both early and delayed emission reductions (Figure SPM.7) [Box SPM 2]. Table 
SPM.5 summarizes the required emissions levels for different groups of stabilization 15 
concentrations and the associated equilibrium global mean temperature increaseTPF35FPT, 
using the ‘best estimate’ of climate sensitivity (see also Figure SPM.8 for the likely 
range of uncertainty)TPF36FPT. Stabilization at lower concentration and related equilibrium 
temperature levels advances the date when emissions need to peak, and requires 
greater emissions reductions by 2050.  20 
 
                                                 
TP
33
PT Paragraph 2A addresses historical GHG emissions since pre-industrial times. 
TP
34
PT Studies vary in terms of the point in time stabilization is achieved; generally this is around 2100 or later. 
TP
35
PT The information on global mean temperature is taken from the AR4 WGI report, chapter 10.8. These 
temperatures are reached well after concentrations are stabilized. 
TP
36
PT The equilibrium climate sensitivity is a measure of the climate system response to sustained radiative 
forcing.  It is not a projection but is defined as the global average surface warming following a doubling of 
carbon dioxide concentrations [AR4 WGI SPM]. 
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Table SPM.5:  Characteristics of post-TAR stabilization scenarios [Table TS 2, 3.10] TPF37FPT 
 
Category Radiative 
Forcing  
 
 
 
 
(W/mP2)P 
COB2 B 
ConcentrationPX39X 
 
 
 
 
(ppm) 
COB2 B-eq 
ConcentrationX39X  
 
 
 
 
(ppm) 
Global mean 
temperature increase 
above pre-industrial at 
equilibrium, using 
“best estimate” 
climate sensitivityTPF38FPT, TPF39FPT  
(ºC) 
Peaking year 
for COB2 B 
emissions TPF40FPT 
 
 
 
(year) 
Change in 
global COB2B 
emissions in 
2050 (% of 
2000 
emissions) PX40X 
(%) 
 
No. of 
assessed 
scenarios 
AA 2.5 – 3.0 350 – 400 445 – 490 2.0 – 2.4 2000 - 2015 -85 to -50 6
AB 3.0 – 3.5 400 – 440 490 – 535 2.4 – 2.8 2000 - 2020 -60 to -30 18
B 3.5 – 4.0 440 – 485 535 – 590 2.8 – 3.2 2010 - 2030 -30 to +5 21
C 4.0 – 5.0 485 – 570 590 – 710 3.2 – 4.0 2020 - 2060 +10 to +60 118
D 5.0 – 6.0 570 – 660 710 – 855 4.0 – 4.9 2050 - 2080 +25 to +85 9
E 6.0 – 7.5 660 – 790 855 – 1130 4.9 – 6.1 2060 - 2090 +90 to +140 5
Total 177
 
[Editorial Note: In the column titled “Category”, AA, AB, B…, will be changed to Roman numerals (I, II, III…)]
                                                 
TP
37
PT The understanding of the climate system response to radiative forcing as well as feedbacks is assessed in detail in the AR4 WGI Report. Feedbacks between 
the carbon cycle and climate change affect the required mitigation for a particular stabilization level of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration. These 
feedbacks are expected to increase the fraction of anthropogenic emissions that remains in the atmosphere as the climate system warms. Therefore, the emission 
reductions to meet a particular stabilization level reported in the mitigation studies assessed here might be underestimated. 
TP
38
PT The best estimate of climate sensitivity is 3ºC [WG 1 SPM]. 
TP
39
PT Note that global mean temperature at equilibrium is different from expected global mean temperature at the time of stabilization of GHG concentrations due to 
the inertia of the climate system. For the majority of scenarios assessed, stabilisation of GHG concentrations occurs between 2100 and 2150. 
TP
40
PT Ranges correspond to the 15 PthP to 85PthP percentile of the post-TAR scenario distribution. CO B2B emissions are shown so multi-gas scenarios can be compared with 
CO B2 B-only scenarios. 
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[Categories will be changed to I to VI; ppmv will be replaced with ppm; GtCOB2 B needs to 
GtCOB2 B / year] 
Figure SPM 7:  Emissions pathways of mitigation scenarios for alternative categories of 5 
stabilization levels (Category I to VI as defined in the box in each panel). The pathways are 
for COB2 B emissions only. Pink shaded (dark) areas give the CO B2 B emissions for the post-TAR 
emissions scenarios.  Green shaded (light) areas depict the range of more than 80 TAR 
stabilization scenarios. Base year emissions may differ between models due to differences in 
sector and industry coverage. To reach the lower stabilization levels some scenarios deploy 10 
removal of COB2 B from the atmosphere (negative emissions) using technologies such as 
biomass energy production utilizing carbon capture and storage. [Figure 3.17] 
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[Capital letters will be changed from AA, AB etc into I to VI; ppmv (x-axis) will be 
changed to ppm; stabilisation in stabilization] 
 
Figure SPM 8:  Stabilization scenario categories as reported in Figure SPM.7 (coloured 5 
bands) and their relationship to equilibrium global mean temperature change above pre-
industrial, using (i) “best estimate” climate sensitivity of 3°C (black line in middle of 
shaded area),  (ii) upper bound of likely range of climate sensitivity of 4.5°C (red line at top 
of shaded area) (iii) lower bound of likely range of climate sensitivity of 2°C (blue line at 
bottom of shaded area). Coloured shading shows the concentration bands for stabilization 10 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere corresponding to the stabilization scenario 
categories I to VI as indicated in Figure SPM.7. The data are drawn from AR4 WGI, 
Chapter 10.8. 
 
19. The range of stabilization levels assessed can be achieved by deployment of a 15 
portfolio of technologies that are currently available and those that are expected to 
be commercialised in coming decades. This assumes that appropriate and effective 
incentives are in place for development, acquisition, deployment and diffusion of 
technologies and for addressing related barriers (high agreement, much evidence). 
• The contribution of different technologies to emission reductions required for 20 
stabilization will vary over time, region and stabilization level.  
o Energy efficiency plays a key role across many scenarios for most regions 
and timescales.  
o For lower stabilization levels, scenarios put more emphasis on the use of 
low-carbon energy sources, such as renewable energy and nuclear power, 25 
and the use of COB2 B capture and storage (CCS). In these scenarios 
improvements of carbon intensity of energy supply and the whole 
economy need to be much faster than in the past.  
o Including non-COB2 B and COB2 Bland-use and forestry mitigation options 
provides greater flexibility and cost-effectiveness for achieving 30 
stabilization. Modern bioenergy could contribute substantially to the share 
of renewable energy in the mitigation portfolio.  
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o For illustrative examples of portfolios of mitigation options, see figure 
SPM.9 [3.3, 3.4]. 
• Investments in and world-wide deployment of low-GHG emission technologies as 
well as technology improvements through public and private Research, 
Development & Demonstration (RD&D) would be required for achieving 5 
stabilization targets as well as cost reduction. The lower the stabilization levels, 
especially those of 550 ppm CO B2 B-eq or lower, the greater the need for more efficient 
RD&D efforts and investment in new technologies during the next few decades. 
• Appropriate incentives could address these barriers and help realize the goals across 
a wide portfolio of technologies. This requires that barriers to development, 10 
acquisition, deployment and diffusion of technologies are effectively addressed. 
[2.7, 3.3, 3.4, 3.6, 4.3, 4.4, 4.6]. 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
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efficiency
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[In figure, “and avoided deforestation” will be removed] 15 
Figure SPM 9: Cumulative emissions reductions for alternative mitigation measures for 
2000 to 2030 (left-hand panel) and for 2000-2100 (right-hand panel). The figure shows 
illustrative scenarios from four models (AIM, IMAGE, IPAC and MESSAGE) aiming at the 
stabilization at 490-540 ppm CO B2 B-eq and levels of 650 ppm COB2 B-eq, respectively. Dark bars 
denote reductions for a target of 650 ppm CO B2 B-eq and light bars the additional reductions 20 
to achieve 490-540 ppm COB2 B-eq. Note that some models do not consider mitigation through 
forest sink enhancement (AIM and IPAC) or CCS (AIM) and that the share of low-carbon 
energy options in total energy supply is also determined by inclusion of these options in the 
baseline. CCS includes carbon capture and storage from biomass. Forest sinks include 
reducing emissions from deforestation. [Figure 3.23] 25 
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20. In 2050 TPF41FPT global average macro-economic costs for multi-gas mitigation towards 
stabilization between 710 and 445 ppm CO B2 B-eq, are between a 1% gain to a 5.5% 
decrease of global GDP (see Table SPM.6). For specific countries and sectors, costs 
vary considerably from the global average. (See Box SPM.3 for the methodologies 
and assumptions and paragraph 5 for explanation of negative costs) (high 5 
agreement, medium evidence). 
 
Table SPM.6: Estimated global macro-economic costs in 2050 relative to the baseline for 
least-cost trajectories towards different long-term stabilization targetsTPF42FPT [3.3, 13.3]  
Stabilization levels  
 
 
(ppm COB2 B-eq) 
Median 
GDP reductionTPF43FPT  
 
(%) 
Range of GDP 
reductionPX43X, TF44FTP  
 
(%) 
Reduction of average 
annual GDP growth 
ratesPX43X, TF45FT  
(percentage points) 
590-710 0.5 -1 – 2 < 0.05 
535-590 1.3 slightly negative – 4 < 0.1 
445- 535 TPF46FPT not available < 5.5 < 0.12 
 10 
21. Decision-making about the appropriate level of global mitigation over time 
involves an iterative risk management process that includes mitigation and 
adaptation, taking into account actual and avoided climate change damages, co-
benefits, sustainability, equity, and attitudes to risk.  Choices about the scale and 
timing of GHG mitigation involve balancing the economic costs of more rapid 15 
emission reductions now against the corresponding medium-term and long-term 
climate risks of delay [high agreement, much evidence]. 
• Limited and early analytical results from integrated analyses of the costs and 
benefits of mitigation indicate that these are broadly comparable in magnitude, but 
do not as yet permit an unambiguous determination of an emissions pathway or 20 
stabilization level where benefits exceed costs [3.5]. 
• Integrated assessment of the economic costs and benefits of different mitigation 
pathways shows that the economically optimal timing and level of mitigation 
depends upon the uncertain shape and character of the assumed climate change 
damage cost curve. To illustrate this dependency:  25 
o if the climate change damage cost curve grows slowly and regularly, and 
there is good foresight (which increases the potential for timely adaptation), 
later and less stringent mitigation is economically justified;  
o alternatively if the damage cost curve increases steeply, or contains non-
linearities (e.g. vulnerability thresholds or even small probabilities of 30 
                                                 
TP
41
PT Cost estimates for 2030 are presented in paragraph 5. 
TP
42
PT This corresponds to the full literature across all baselines and mitigation scenarios that provide GDP 
numbers.  
TP
43
PT This is global GDP based market exchange rates. 
TP
44
PT The median and the 10PthP and 90PthP percentile range of the analyzed data are given. 
TP
45
PT The calculation of the reduction of the annual growth rate is based on the average reduction during the 
period until 2050 that would result in the indicated GDP decrease in 2050. 
TP
46
PT The number of studies is relatively small and they generally use low baselines. High emissions baselines 
generally lead to higher costs. 
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catastrophic events), earlier and more stringent mitigation is economically 
justified [3.6]. 
• Climate sensitivity is a key uncertainty for mitigation scenarios that aim to meet a 
specific temperature level. Studies show that if climate sensitivity is high then the 
timing and level of mitigation is earlier and more stringent than when it is low [3.5, 5 
3.6].  
• Delayed emission reductions lead to investments that lock in more emission-
intensive infrastructure and development pathways. This significantly constrains the 
opportunities to achieve lower stabilization levels (as shown in Table SPM.5) and 
increases the risk of more severe climate change impacts [3.4, 3.1, 3.5, 3.6]      10 
 
 
Box SPM.4: Modelling induced technological change 
 
Relevant literature implies that policies and measures may induce technological change. 15 
Remarkable progress has been achieved in applying approaches based on induced 
technological change to stabilisation studies; however, conceptual issues remain.  In the 
models that adopt these approaches, projected costs for a given stabilization level are 
reduced; the reductions are greater at lower stabilisation levels.  
 20 
 
 
E. Policies, measures and instruments to mitigate climate change 
 
22. A wide variety of national policies and instruments are available to governments to 25 
create the incentives for mitigation action.  Their applicability depends on national 
circumstances and an understanding of their interactions, but experience from 
implementation in various countries and sectors shows there are advantages and 
disadvantages for any given instrument (high agreement, much evidence). 
• Four main criteria are used to evaluate policies and instruments: environmental 30 
effectiveness, cost effectiveness, distributional effects, including equity, and 
institutional feasibility [13.2]. 
• All instruments can be designed well or poorly, and be stringent or lax. In addition, 
monitoring to improve implementation is an important issue for all instruments. 
General findings about the performance of policies are: [7.9, 12.2,13.2] 35 
o Integrating climate policies in broader development policies makes 
implementation and overcoming barriers easier.  
o Regulations and standards generally provide some certainty about emission 
levels. They may be preferable to other instruments when information or other 
barriers prevent producers and consumers from responding to price signals. 40 
However, they may not induce innovations and more advanced technologies. 
o Taxes and charges can set a price for carbon, but cannot guarantee a particular 
level of emissions. Literature identifies taxes as an efficient way of 
internalizing costs of GHG emissions. 
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o Tradable permits will establish a carbon price. The volume of allowed 
emissions determines their environmental effectiveness, while the allocation of 
permits has distributional consequences. Fluctuation in the price of carbon 
makes it difficult to estimate the total cost of complying with emission permits. 
o Financial incentives (subsidies and tax credits) are frequently used by 5 
governments to stimulate the development and diffusion of new technologies.  
While economic costs are generally higher than for the instruments listed 
above, they are often critical to overcome barriers. 
o Voluntary agreements between industry and governments are politically 
attractive, raise awareness among stakeholders, and have played a role in the 10 
evolution of many national policies. The majority of agreements has not 
achieved significant emissions reductions beyond business as usual. However, 
some recent agreements, in a few countries, have accelerated the application of 
best available technology and led to measurable emission reductions.  
o Information instruments (e.g. awareness campaigns) may positively affect 15 
environmental quality by promoting informed choices and possibly 
contributing to behavioural change, however, their impact on emissions has not 
been measured yet. 
o RD&D can stimulate technological advances, reduce costs, and enable progress 
toward stabilization. 20 
•  Some corporations, local and regional authorities, NGOs and civil groups are 
adopting a wide variety of voluntary actions. These voluntary actions may limit 
GHG emissions, stimulate innovative policies, and encourage the deployment of 
new technologies. On their own, they generally have limited impact on the national 
or regional level emissions [13.4].  25 
•  Lessons learned from specific sector application of national policies and 
instruments are shown in Table SPM.7. 
 
23. Policies that provide a real or implicit price of carbon could create incentives for 
producers and consumers to significantly invest in low-GHG products, 30 
technologies and processes.  Such policies could include economic instruments, 
government funding and regulation (high agreement, much evidence).  
• An effective carbon-price signal could realize significant mitigation potential in all 
sectors [11.3, 13.2]. 
• Modelling studies (see Box SPM.3) show carbon prices rising to 20 to 80 35 
US$/tCOB2 B-eq by 2030 and 30 to 155 US$/tCOB2 B-eq by 2050 are consistent with 
stabilization at around 550 ppm CO B2 B-eq by 2100. For the same stabilization level, 
studies since TAR that take into account induced technological change lower these 
price ranges to 5 to 65 US$/tCOB2 Beq in 2030 and 15 to 130 US$/tCOB2 B-eq in 2050 
[3.3, 11.4, 11.5]. 40 
• Most top-down, as well as some 2050 bottom-up assessments, suggest that real or 
implicit carbon prices of 20 to 50 US$/tCO B2 B-eq, sustained or increased over decades, 
could lead to a power generation sector with low-GHG emissions by 2050 and make 
many mitigation options in the end-use sectors economically attractive. [4.4,11.6] 
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• Barriers to the implementation of mitigation options are manifold and vary by 
country and sector. They can be related to financial, technological, institutional, 
informational and behavioural aspects [4.5, 5.5, 6.7, 7.6, 8.6, 9.6, 10.5]. 
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Table SPM.7:  Selected sectoral policies, measures and instruments that have shown to be 
environmentally effective in the respective sector in at least a number of national cases. 
 
Sector PoliciesTPF47FPT,  measures and instruments 
shown to be environmentally effective 
Key constraints or 
opportunities 
Reduction of fossil fuel subsidies 
Taxes or carbon charges on fossil fuels 
Resistance by vested interests 
may make them difficult to 
implement 
Feed-in tariffs for  renewable energy 
technologies 
Renewable energy obligations 
Energy supply [4.5]  
Producer subsidies 
May be appropriate to create 
markets for low emissions 
technologies 
Mandatory fuel economy, biofuel blending 
and COB2 B standards for road transport 
Partial coverage of vehicle fleet 
may limit effectiveness 
Taxes on vehicle purchase, registration, use 
and motor fuels, road and parking pricing 
Effectiveness may drop with 
higher incomes 
Influence mobility needs through land use 
regulations, and infrastructure planning  
Transport [5.5] 
Investment in attractive public transport 
facilities and non-motorised forms of 
transport 
Particularly appropriate for 
countries that are building up 
their transportation systems 
Appliance standards and labelling Periodic revision of standards 
needed 
Building codes and certification Attractive for new buildings. 
Enforcement can be difficult  
Demand-side management programmes Need for regulations so that 
utilities may profit 
Public sector leadership programmes, 
including procurement 
Government purchasing can 
expand demand for energy-
efficient products 
Buildings [6.8] 
Incentives for energy service companies 
(ESCOs) 
Success factor: Access to third 
party financing  
Provision of benchmark information 
Performance standards 
Subsidies, tax credits 
May be appropriate to stimulate 
technology uptake. Stability of 
national policy important in 
view of international 
competitiveness 
Tradable permits Predictable allocation 
mechanisms and stable price 
signals important for 
investments  
Industry [7.9] 
Voluntary agreements Success factors include: clear 
                                                 
TP
47
PT Public RD&D investment in low emission technologies have proven to be effective in all sectors.  
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Sector PoliciesTPF47FPT,  measures and instruments 
shown to be environmentally effective 
Key constraints or 
opportunities 
 targets, a baseline scenario, 
third party involvement in 
design and review and formal 
provisions of monitoring, close 
cooperation between 
government and industry. 
Agriculture [8.6, 
8.7, 8.8] 
Financial incentives and regulations for 
improved land management, maintaining 
soil carbon content, efficient use of 
fertilizers and irrigation  
May encourage synergy with 
sustainable development and 
with reducing vulnerability to 
climate change, thereby 
overcoming barriers to 
implementation 
Financial incentives (national and 
international) to increase forest area, to 
reduce deforestation, and to maintain and 
manage forests  
Forestry/Forests 
[9.6] 
Land use regulation and enforcement 
Constraints include lack of 
investment capital and land 
tenure issues. Can help poverty 
alleviation. 
 
Financial incentives for improved waste and 
wastewater management 
May stimulate technology 
diffusion 
Renewable energy incentives or obligations Local availability of low-cost 
fuel 
Waste management 
[10.5] 
Waste management regulations Most effectively applied at 
national level with enforcement 
strategies 
 
 
24. Government support through financial contributions, tax credits, standard setting 
and market creation is important for effective technology development, innovation 
and deployment. Transfer of technology to developing countries depends on 5 
enabling conditions and financing (high agreement, much evidence). 
• Public benefits of RD&D investments are bigger than the benefits captured by the 
private sector, justifying government support of RD&D.  
• Government funding in real absolute terms for most energy research programmes 
has been flat or declining for nearly two decades (even after the UNFCCC came into 10 
force) and is now about half of the 1980 level [2.7, 3.4, 4.5, 11.5, 13.2]. 
• Governments have a crucial supportive role in providing appropriate enabling 
environment, such as, institutional, policy, legal and regulatory frameworksTPF48FPT,  to 
sustain investment flows and for effective technology transfer – without which it 
may be difficult to achieve emission reductions at a significant scale. Mobilizing 15 
                                                 
TP
48
PT See the IPCC Special Report on Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer. 
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financing of incremental costs of low-carbon technologies is important. International 
technology agreements could strengthen the knowledge infrastructure [13.3]. 
• The potential beneficial effect of technology transfer to developing countries 
brought about by Annex I countries action may be substantial, but no reliable 
estimates are available [11.7]. 5 
• Financial flows to developing countries through CDM projects have the potential to 
reach levels of the order of several billions US$ per yearTPF49FPT, which is higher than the 
flows through the Global Environment Facility (GEF), comparable to the energy 
oriented development assistance flows, but at least an order of magnitude lower than 
total foreign direct investment flows. The financial flows through CDM, GEF and 10 
development assistance for technology transfer have so far been limited and 
geographically unequally distributed [12.3, 13.3]. 
 
25. Notable achievements of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto protocol are the 
establishment of a global response to the climate problem, stimulation of an array 15 
of national policies, the creation of an international carbon market and the 
establishment of new institutional mechanisms that may provide the foundation for 
future mitigation efforts (high agreement, much evidence).  
• The impact of the protocol’s first commitment period relative to global emissions is 
projected to be limited. Its economic impacts on participating Annex-B countries are 20 
projected to be smaller than presented in TAR, that showed 0.2-2% lower GDP in 
2012 without emissions trading, and 0.1-1.1% lower GDP with emissions trading 
among Annex-B countries [1.4, 11.4, 13.3]. 
 
26. The literature identifies many options for achieving reductions of global GHG 25 
emissions at the international level through cooperation. It also suggests that 
successful agreements are environmentally effective, cost-effective, incorporate 
distributional considerations and equity, and are institutionally feasible (high 
agreement, much evidence).  
• Greater cooperative efforts to reduce emissions will help to reduce global costs for 30 
achieving a given level of mitigation, or will improve environmental effectiveness 
[13.3]. 
• Improving, and expanding the scope of, market mechanisms (such as emission 
trading, Joint Implementation and CDM) could reduce overall mitigation costs 
[13.3]. 35 
• Efforts to address climate change can include diverse elements such as emissions 
targets; sectoral, local, sub-national and regional actions; RD&D programmes; 
adopting common policies; implementing development oriented actions; or 
expanding financing instruments. These elements can be implemented in an 
integrated fashion, but comparing the efforts made by different countries 40 
quantitatively would be complex and resource intensive [13.3]. 
                                                 
TP
49
PT Depends strongly on the market price that has fluctuated between 4 and 26 US$/tCOB2B-eq and based on 
approximately 1000 CDM proposed plus registered projects likely to generate more than 1.3 billion emission 
reduction credits before 2012. 
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• Actions that could be taken by participating countries can be differentiated both in 
terms of when such action is undertaken, who participates and what the action will 
be. Actions can be binding or non-binding, include fixed or dynamic targets, and 
participation can be static or vary over time [13.3]. 
 5 
 
F. Sustainable development and climate change mitigation 
 
27. Making development more sustainable by changing development paths can make a 
major contribution to climate change mitigation, but implementation may require 10 
resources to overcome multiple barriers. There is a growing understanding of the 
possibilities to choose and implement mitigation options in several sectors to realize 
synergies and avoid conflicts with other dimensions of sustainable development 
(high agreement, much evidence). 
• Irrespective of the scale of mitigation measures, adaptation measures are necessary 15 
[1.2]. 
• Addressing climate change can be considered an integral element of sustainable 
development policies. National circumstances and the strengths of institutions 
determine how development policies impact GHG emissions. Changes in 
development paths emerge from the interactions of public and private decision 20 
processes involving government, business and civil society, many of which are not 
traditionally considered as climate policy. This process is most effective when actors 
participate equitably and decentralized decision making processes are coordinated 
[2.2, 3.3, 12.2]. 
• Climate change and other sustainable development policies are often but not always 25 
synergistic. There is growing evidence that decisions about macroeconomic policy, 
agricultural policy, multilateral development bank lending, insurance practices, 
electricity market reform, energy security and forest conservation, for example, 
which are often treated as being apart from climate policy, can significantly reduce 
emissions. On the other hand, decisions about improving rural access to modern 30 
energy sources for example may not have much influence on global GHG emissions 
[12.2]. 
• Climate change policies related to energy efficiency and renewable energy are often 
economically beneficial, improve energy security and reduce local pollutant 
emissions. Other energy supply mitigation options can be designed to also achieve 35 
sustainable development benefits such as avoided displacement of local populations, 
job creation, and health benefits [4.5,12.3]. 
• Reducing both loss of natural habitat and deforestation can have significant 
biodiversity, soil and water conservation benefits, and can be implemented in a 
socially and economically sustainable manner. Forestation and bioenergy plantations 40 
can lead to restoration of degraded land, manage water runoff, retain soil carbon and 
benefit rural economies, but could compete with land for food production and may 
be negative for biodiversity, if not properly designed [9.7, 12.3]. 
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• There are also good possibilities for reinforcing sustainable development through 
mitigation actions in the waste management, transportation and buildings sectors 
[5.4, 6.6, 10.5, 12.3]. 
• Making development more sustainable can enhance both mitigative and adaptive 
capacity, and reduce emissions and vulnerability to climate change. Synergies 5 
between mitigation and adaptation can exist, for example properly designed biomass 
production, formation of protected areas, land management, energy use in buildings 
and forestry. In other situations, there may be trade-offs, such as increased GHG 
emissions due to increased consumption of energy related to adaptive responses  
[2.5, 3.5, 4.5, 6.9, 7.8, 8.5, 9.5, 11.9, 12.1]. 10 
 
 
G. Gaps in knowledge 
 
28. There are still relevant gaps in currently available knowledge regarding some 15 
aspects of mitigation of climate change, especially in developing countries. 
Additional research addressing those gaps would further reduce uncertainties and 
thus facilitate decision-making related to mitigation of climate change [TS.14]. 
 
 20 
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Endbox 1:  Uncertainty representation 
 
Uncertainty is an inherent feature of any assessment. The fourth assessment report clarifies 
the uncertainties associated with essential statements.  
 5 
Fundamental differences between the underlying disciplinary sciences of the three Working 
Group reports make a common approach impractical. The “likelihood” approach applied in 
"Climate change 2007, the physical science basis" and the “confidence” and “likelihood” 
approaches used in "Climate change 2007, impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability" were 
judged to be inadequate to deal with the specific uncertainties involved in this mitigation 10 
report, as here human choices are considered.  
 
In this report a two-dimensional scale is used for the treatment of uncertainty. The scale is 
based on the expert judgment of the authors of WGIII on the level of concurrence in the 
literature on a particular finding (level of agreement), and the number and quality of 15 
independent sources qualifying under the IPCC rules upon which the finding is based 
(amount of evidenceTPF50FPT) (see Table SPM.E.1). This is not a quantitative approach, from which 
probabilities relating to uncertainty can be derived.  
 
Table SPM E.1:  Qualitative definition of uncertainty 20 
 
 High agreement, 
limited evidence 
High agreement, 
medium evidence 
High agreement, 
much evidence 
 
Medium agreement, 
limited evidence 
Medium agreement, 
medium evidence 
Medium agreement, 
much evidence 
Level of 
agreement  
(on a particular 
finding) 
Low agreement, 
limited evidence 
Low agreement, 
medium evidence 
Low agreement, 
much evidence 
  
Amount of evidencePX50X P(number and quality of independent sources)  
 
Because the future is inherently uncertain, scenarios i.e. internally consistent images of 
different futures - not predictions of the future - have been used extensively in this report.   
 25 
                                                 
TP
50
PT  “Evidence” in this report is defined as: Information or signs indicating whether a belief or proposition is 
true or valid. See Glossary. 
 
